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I.	Introduction	
	 Turkey’s	 Justice	 and	 Development	 Party,	 known	 as	 the	 AKP	 in	 Turkish,	 has	 been	 the	
majority	party	of	Turkey’s	parliament	and	government	since	it	first	contested	Turkish	elections	
in	2002.		The	AKP	party	follows	a	conservative,	Islamist	platform	and	is	especially	popular	with	
Muslim	 businessmen	 from	 Central	 Turkey.	 	 Recep	 Tayip	 Erdogan,	 the	 party’s	 initial	 Prime	
Minister	now-turned	President,	has	been	 the	main	decision-maker	and	 leader,	 increasing	 the	
responsibilities	and	role	of	Turkey’s	President	in	the	national	and	international	context.		He	has	
been	 a	 source	 of	 concern	 for	 Turks	 and	 other	 governments	 around	 the	 world,	 from	 his	
numerous	corruption	scandals,	violent	suppressions	of	protests	and	 limitations	of	 freedom	of	
press	and	speech.		Yet,	through	all	of	his	internationally	known	disasters	and	mess-ups,	the	AKP	
continues	to	be	a	flourishing	party	in	Turkey.			
The	major	social	cleavage	in	Turkey,	represented	through	political	divisions,	is	between	
the	 more	 developed,	 secular,	 Western	 Turkey	 and	 the	 less	 developed,	 less	 secular,	 Eastern	
Turkey.	 	 The	CHP	 (Republican	People’s	 Party),	 the	 liberal,	 secular	 opposition	party	 in	 Turkey,	
very	clearly	follows	this	cleavage.		As	seen	in	the	CHP	support	map	below,	Figure	1,	the	majority	
of	 their	 support	 is	 located	 in	Western	Turkey,	where	 the	population	 is	generally	more	 liberal	
and	secular.	 	The	AKP,	though,	does	not	follow	this	traditional	cleavage,	as	shown	in	Figure	2.		
They	have	support	in	every	region	of	Turkey,	ranging	from	western	cities	to	eastern	towns.		This	
in	turn	is	in	quite	severe	contrast	to	the	geography	of	support	for	the	CHP.		
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Figure	1:	
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The	objective	of	 this	 thesis	 is	 therefore	 to	understand	a	problem	 in	 the	geography	of	
voting	 in	Turkey:	why	support	 for	the	AKP	 is	seemingly	 indifferent	to	region	while	that	of	the	
CHP	is	highly	concentrated	geographically.	Otherwise	put,	why	is	it	that	the	secularizing	forces	
in	 Turkey	 are	 so	 limited	 in	 their	 geographic	 support	 while	 the	 more	 traditional,	 Islamic	
opposition	 enjoys	 a	 more	 widespread	 support	 base.	 To	 answer	 these	 questions,	 I	 will	 be	
addressing	many	issues	of	Turkish	social	life	including	rural	to	urban	migration	and	East	to	West	
migration,	 the	 Anatolian	 Tiger	 phenomenon,	 various	 degrees	 and	 statistics	 of	 development	
across	the	Turkish	regions,	and	support	for	the	other	three	main	Turkish	political	parties:	CHP,	
HDP,	and	MHP.		I	hypothesize	that	there	are	three	reasons	for	the	puzzling	degree	of	national	
support	 for	 the	 AKP,	 and	why,	 as	 one	would	 expect	 from	 a	 traditional	 conservative,	mildly-
Islamist	party,	they	have	no	relationship	with	under	developed	regions:			
Reason	1.	HDP	Support	in	Eastern	Anatolia	
Reason	2.	The	Anatolian	Tiger	Phenomenon	 	
Reason	3.	The	Politics	of	Difference	in	Western	Cities	
In	 the	 first	 section	 of	 this	 thesis,	 I	 describe	 Turkey’s	 party	 political	 relationships	 with	
development,	 and	 which	 regions	 are	 more	 developed	 over	 others	 and	 why,	 through	 a	
development	index	that	I	created.		I	also	explain	why	the	AKP	does	not	have	a	concentration	of	
support	in	under-developed	regions,	unlike	what	one	would	expect	from	a	conservative,	mildly-
Islamist	 party.	 	 HDP	 support	 in	 Southeastern	 Anatolia,	 is	 a	 large	 reason	 for	 this,	 and	 I	 will	
explain	further	why	one	can	assume	this.	 	The	second	section	will	address	the	Anatolian	Tiger	
phenomenon,	and	I	will	provide	my	reasoning	for	their	high	levels	of	support	for	the	AKP,	which	
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will	 be	 evident	 in	 the	maps	 and	 data	 that	 I	 provide.	 	 In	 the	 third	 section	 of	 the	 thesis	 I	will	
explain	why	the	politics	of	difference	in	Western	cities	increases	AKP	support	in	areas	of	Turkey	
where	one	would	otherwise	not	expect	them	to	do	well.		
	
II.	Uneven	Development	and	Turkey’s	Electoral	Geography	
	 Turkey	is	a	land	of	quite	severe	uneven	development.		Differences	between	the	Western	
cities	 and	 the	 Eastern	 towns	 are	 extreme,	 and	 obvious	 through	 the	 statistics	 of	 the	 NUTS1	
regions.	 	 Because	 development	 is	 usually	 a	 major	 political	 stake,	 there	 is	 an	 association	
between	the	support	for	different	parties	and	levels	of	development.		Electoral	geography	and	
uneven	development	have	had	a	long,	historical	relationship	in	Turkey.	
	
Development	in	Turkey:	
	 Development	 is	 first	 and	 foremost	 an	 economic	 process,	 a	 matter	 of	 developing	
people’s	 capabilities	 to	 produce.	 	 This	 economic	 process	 created	 today’s	 modern	 economy,	
originally	 an	 agricultural	 centric	 world	 that	 gradually	 shifted	 to	 industry	 and	 then	 to	 the	
expansion	of	the	service	sector	through	the	increase	of	technology.		The	overall	tendency	is	for	
people’s	 ability	 to	 produce	 to	 increase	 over	 time	 through	 technical	 innovation.	 	 Goods	 and	
services	being	produced	all	 enter	 the	 competitive	economic	market,	where	 jobs	and	product	
																																								 																				
1	Nomenclature	of	Territorial	Units	for	Statistics	(NUTS)	
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markets	 are	 fiercely	 fought	 over.	 	 In	 turn,	 wages	 and	 incomes	 rise	 for	 those	 who	 create,	
produce	and	sell	the	goods.			
	 In	 Turkey,	 a	 traditional	 social	 view	 preceded	 the	 development	 process.	 	 Based	 on	
traditional	gender,	age,	and	nobility	roles	connected	to	religion,	people	were	assigned	ranked	
roles	 within	 their	 society	 and	 community.	 	 Traditional	 society	 functioned	 through	 the	
reinforcement	of	these	ranked	roles,	which	kept	everyone	in	their	“place”	doing	their	assigned	
job,	 like	 a	 woman	 as	 a	 caretaker	 and	 housewife	 or	 an	 African	 slave	 as	 subordinate	 to	 their	
master.	 	Turkish	 traditional	 society	also	 functioned	on	 the	belief	and	practice	of	 religion,	and	
this	was	a	significant	influence	over	the	daily	lives	of	the	majority	of	Turks.		In	other	words,	the	
social	 order	 of	 genders,	 ages	 and	 the	 nobility/commoner	 relationship	was	 as	 it	was	 because	
religion	endorsed	it.		Because	of	the	effect	religion	had	on	people’s	lives,	the	society	was	static,	
leaving	traditional	values	in	place	for	generations	to	help	some	and	hurt	others.					
	 When	faced	with	the	development	process,	this	type	of	society	quickly	dissolves.		While	
some	members	of	 the	 traditional	 society	are	able	 to	adapt	 to	 their	new	and	modern	society,	
others	struggle.	 	A	change	to	an	increasingly	modern	society	threatens	the	lives	of	those	who	
have	 a	 stake	 in	 traditional	 values	 and	 society,	 and	who	benefit	 from	 religion	being	practiced	
and	 followed	by	all.	 	Not	only	does	 the	development	process	dissolve	 the	 traditional	 societal	
relations	and	values,	it	also	provokes	a	counter	reaction	from	those	who	will	be	losing	the	most	
from	the	societal	change:	 the	men,	 the	old,	 the	 religious	hierarchy,	 the	nobility	or	 traditional	
land-owning	class	whose	land	ownership	was	legitimated	by	ideas	of	societal	superiority.		What	
is	at	stake	is	not	just	material	or	a	matter	of	men	wanting	women	to	wait	on	them	but	also	a	
matter	of	status	and	preserving	traditional	manners	of	respect	(Ex.	“respect	your	elders”).			
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	 Changes	 in	 the	 economy	 are	 fundamental	 to	 developing	 a	 society.	 	 To	 promote	 the	
development	process,	technological	changes	and	expansions	must	occur.	 	These	technological	
changes	 require	 an	 advanced	 scientific	 knowledge	 and	 skillset.	 	 The	 increase	 in	 scientific	
understanding	 leads	 to	 skepticism	 towards	 religion	 and	 other	 traditions.	 	 The	 constant	
competition	for	jobs,	employees,	and	product	markets	in	the	modern	economic	system	leads	to	
inequality	between	different	groups	of	people,	a	social	hierarchy	of	people	dependent	on	race,	
gender,	 sexual	 orientation,	 ability,	 etc.	 	 This	 inequality	 creates	 a	 counter	movement,	 one	 for	
equality	for	all,	leading	to	the	devaluation	of	the	traditional	social	hierarchy.		As	an	employer	or	
seller	 of	 goods	 and	 services,	 this	 move	 towards	 equality	 will	 only	 benefit	 your	 cause.	 	 The	
employer	wants	anyone	who	would	be	able	to	do	the	job,	regardless	of	race	or	gender,	and	the	
seller	only	wants	his	product	to	be	bought.				
		 	To	 accurately	 portray	 levels	 of	 uneven	 development	 across	 Turkey,	 I	 have	 created	 a	
development	index	of	various	variables	that	are	related	to	the	level	of	development	of	an	area.		
This	 index	 was	 created	 by	 calculating	 the	 z-score,	 a	 statistical	 measurement	 of	 a	 variables	
relationship	with	 the	mean	 (in	 this	 case,	 the	mean	 is	 zero),	 combining	 all	 of	 the	 z-scores	 for	
each	variable	in	each	region,	and	comparing	the	regions	overall	z-scores.		This	index	allows	for	a	
numerical	 analysis	 of	 levels	 of	 development	 across	 Turkey	 and	 the	 ability	 to	 compare	 two	
regions	easily	and	quickly.		Below	is	an	analysis	of	the	variables	used	in	the	development	index,	
why	 they	 were	 used	 and	 what	 their	 relationship	 to	 development	 is.	 	 The	 variables	 for	 the	
development	index	are	as	follows:		
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Income	Per	Capita:		
	 Economic	 development	 is	 absolutely	 crucial	 when	 creating	 a	 development	 index,	
allowing	 the	 index	 to	 address	 all	 aspects	 of	 society.	 	 Income	 Per	 Capita	 is	 informative	 of	 a	
society’s	 level	 of	 economic	 development,	 with	 high	 averages	 exhibiting	 a	 more	 developed	
society.	 	 A	 person	 with	 higher	 levels	 of	 education,	 living	 and	 working	 in	 a	 competitive,	
industrialized	society	will	have	higher	income	levels	than	one	working	in	the	agricultural	sector	
of	a	society	that	struggles	with	low	education	levels.			
Net	In-Migration:	
	 The	more	developed	a	region	is,	the	more	immigrants	it	will	receive	from	other	regions.		
This	 is	 because	 there	 are	more	 jobs	 available	 due	 to	 high	 industrialization,	 better	 education	
opportunities,	and	a	diverse	culture	from	previous	migrants.			
Labor	Force	Participation:		
	 This	variable	 is	relevant	to	creating	a	development	 index	that	encompasses	all	aspects	
of	 society.	 	 The	 bigger	 the	 percentage	 of	 citizens	 involved	 in	 formal	 labor	 sectors,	 the	more	
industrially	advanced	the	region	is.		This	is	because	there	are	fewer	people	participating	in	the	
agriculture	sector,	which	is	only	needed	if	industrialization	hasn’t	yet	taken	place	in	the	society	
and	food	importation	and	mass	production	are	not	being	implemented.			
Fertility	Rate:	
	 It	 is	 very	 common	 to	 see	 less	developed	 countries	with	demographic	 charts	 that	 look	
like	 pyramids,	 with	 a	 large	 section	 of	 their	 population	 aged	 20	 and	 below.	 	 This	 is	 because	
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people	need	more	children	to	work	their	land	for	agriculture.		The	more	industrialized	an	area	
grows,	though,	the	less	profitable	it	becomes	to	have	more	children.	 	School	 is	expensive	and	
land	does	not	need	to	be	harvested.		Therefore,	the	higher	the	fertility	rate	of	a	region,	the	less	
developed	the	region	is.			
Bride	Age:		
	 Using	Bride	Age	as	a	variable	on	Turkey’s	development	index	is	useful	in	determining	the	
level	of	modernization	that	a	certain	society	has	reached.		The	younger	the	average	bride	age	
for	a	province,	 the	more	traditional,	conservative,	and	usually	 Islamic	 the	people	 living	 in	 the	
specific	region	are.		Young	brides	are	women	who	normally	do	not	have	a	choice	of	who	they	
are	marrying	and	do	not	receive	high	levels	of	education,	which	reflect	under-development	in	
the	regions	where	the	average	bride	age	is	low.			
Divorce	Rate:	
	 A	region’s	average	divorce	rate	is	an	informative	way	to	analyze	women’s	rights	in	the	
area.		The	higher	the	average	divorce	rate	is,	the	more	say	women	have	in	their	marriage	and	
the	 more	 choice	 they	 have	 to	 stay	 in	 it	 or	 not.	 	 Higher	 divorce	 rates	 show	 high	 levels	 of	
development.			
Bride	Price:	
	 The	simple	presence	of	this	variable	within	a	development	 index	exhibits	a	traditional,	
conservative	society,	that	looks	at	women	as	objects	to	be	sold	and	bought.		This	variable	gives	
the	reader	perspective	into	the	daily	lives,	cultural,	and	social	norms	of	conservative	Turkey.	
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Religious	Weddings:	
	 While	 religious	 weddings	 take	 place	 regularly	 in	 states	 that	 are	 considered	 highly	
developed,	the	higher	the	percentage	of	religious	weddings	to	non-religious	weddings	a	region	
has,	the	more	 likely	 it	 is	to	be	 less	developed.	 	This	variable	shows	that	traditional	values	are	
still	important	to	the	citizens	of	the	area	being	analyzed.			
Marriage	to	Close	Relatives:	
	 A	high	percentage	of	this	variable	present	in	a	region’s	development	index	shows	a	very	
traditional	 and	 under-developed	 society.	 	 Marriage	 to	 family	 happens	 in	 very	 conservative	
areas,	usually	located	in	Central	and	East	Anatolia.			
Below	is	a	map	of	the	development	 levels	for	each	region.	 	After	finding	regional	data	
for	all	of	the	above	variables,	I	used	an	equation	to	make	each	stat	a	z-score,	so	they	would	all	
have	the	same	levels	of	measurement.	 	Then,	I	added	all	the	z-scores	for	each	variable	up	for	
each	province	to	create	a	development	score.		This	score	was	then	mapped.		One	can	see	a	very	
clear	 relationship	 in	 Figure	 3	 between	 development	 and	 geography,	 with	 Western	 Turkey	
scoring	higher	and	the	scores	getting	lower	as	you	move	East.	
Figure	3:	
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Political	Parties	in	Turkey:	
	 Turkish	 political	 parties	 are	 unlike	 the	 typical	 left/right	 division	 found	 in	 the	 United	
States	 and	 around	 the	 world.	 	 The	 parties	 are	 much	 more	 closely	 associated	 with	 cultural	
divisions	within	the	Turkish	population,	and	they	fight	to	represent	the	values,	religion,	rights,	
and	wants	of	 the	cultural	 group	 that	 supports	 them.	 	This	 is	evident	 in	 the	CHP	party,	which	
supports	a	secular	government	that	benefits	the	Western,	urban	Turks.		These	cultural	divisions	
are	clearly	geographic,	and	CHP	party	support	is	geographically	concentrated	in	their	predicted	
base	of	support,	the	West	(see	Figure	1	above.)			
	 The	 nature	 of	 Turkish	 party	 politics	 has	 changed	 very	 little	 since	 the	 creation	 of	 the	
Turkish	Republic	 in	1923.	 	As	mentioned	above,	political	parties	 represent	 cultural	 cleavages.		
Cultural	 cleavages	 include:	 secular	 /	 Islamic,	 gender	 equality	 /	 gender	 inequality,	 and	
Westernizing/traditional.		These	cleavages	have	been	present	in	Turkish	party	politics	since	the	
formation	 of	 the	 Republic,	 stemming	 from	 the	 Young	 Turk	movement	 and	 the	 rapid,	 forced	
Westernization	of	the	new	country.		 	
	 The	Young	Turks,	a	group	formed	in	1889	in	the	Ottoman	Empire,	were	the	first	group	of	
people	 to	 call	 for	 a	 Westernized,	 nationalistic,	 and	 industrialized	 empire.	 	 They	 heavily	
disagreed	 with	 Sultan	 Abdulhamid	 II,	 an	 authoritarian	 leader	 who	 ran	 the	 empire	 through	
policies	of	extreme	censorship,	Islamic	values	and	relationships,	and	used	a	secret	police	force	
to	scare	Ottomans	into	following	his	rules.		The	Young	Turks	began	to	plot	a	revolution,	and	in	
1908	started	an	empire-wide	rebellion	and	forced	the	empire	to	reinstate	the	constitution	and	
call	 Parliament	 back	 to	 session.	 	 Then,	 in	 1913,	 the	 Young	 Turks	 gained	 control	 of	 Ottoman	
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politics,	eventually	leading	to	the	dissolution	of	the	Ottoman	Empire	after	its	weakening	in	the	
wake	of	defeat	in	World	War	I,	and	the	creation	of	a	secular	Turkish	Republic.			
	 	Mustafa	Kemal,	a	Young	Turk	and	general	 in	 the	Turkish	army,	carried	out	 the	Young	
Turks’	goals	for	a	Turkish	Republic,	and	in	1919	started	a	rebellion	against	Western	control	of	
Turkey	 after	 their	 World	 War	 I	 loss.	 	 After	 numerous	 victories,	 Mustafa	 Kemal	 created	 a	
provincial	government	in	Ankara	and	formed	the	Republic	of	Turkey	a	year	after	in	1923.		As	a	
Young	Turk,	Mustafa	Kemal,	later	called	Ataturk	(“Father	of	Turks”),	wanted	a	secular,	Western,	
and	modern	Republic.	 	He	rapidly	Westernized	Turkey	by	emancipating	women,	abolishing	all	
Islamic	institutions,	and	forcing	Western	codes,	dress,	education,	and	calendar.		He	also	called	
for	a	new	Turkish	language,	one	that	used	the	Latin	alphabet	and	less	Arabic	and	Persian	words.		
Because	 Ataturk	was	 a	 general	 in	 the	 army,	 the	 army	 became	 the	 enforcers	 of	 his	 Kemalist	
policies.	 	 The	 relationship	 between	 the	 army	 and	 Kemalism	 is	 still	 alive	 today,	 as	 historically	
they	have	deposed	leaders	and	parties	that	they	regarded	as	unsecular	or	Anti-Kemalist.			
	 While	 Ataturk	 was	 in	 control	 of	 Turkish	 politics,	 many	 parties	 were	 shut	 down	 and	
censored.		Ataturk	wanted	to	ensure	that	his	modernization	mission	would	succeed	and	refused	
to	 let	any	other	party	 impede	it.	 	From	this	party	censorship	grew	the	Anti-Kemalism	political	
movement.	 	 This	 movement	 has	 lasted	 since	 the	 formation	 of	 the	 Republic,	 because	 not	
everyone	benefitted	from	Turkey’s	intense	Westernization.		Today’s	modern	parties	are	perfect	
examples	of	the	social	cleavages	long	affecting	Turkey’s	political	parties.			
Since	Turkey	has	been	a	democratic	country,	the	CHP	and	the	Turkish	army	have	always	
represented	 the	 liberal,	 secular,	 wing	 of	 party	 politics,	 carrying	 on	 Ataturk’s	 legacies	 and	
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Kemalist	policies.		This	is	obvious	from	the	table	below,	which	shows	a	steady	representation	of	
Kemalist	 political	 attitudes	 by	 the	 CHP,	 often	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 party	 of	 Ataturk.	 	 The	 Anti-
Kemalist	parties,	on	the	other	hand,	are	consistently	changing	throughout	Turkish	party	politics	
history.		This	is	due	to	repeated	interventions	from	the	Turkish	army	(a	Kemalist	ideal-enforcing	
agency)	and	then	forced	rebirth	to	a	more	moderate	voice.		
	
Table	1:	Political	Party	History	in	Turkey	
PERIOD	 MODERNIZING	 CONSERVATIVE	
1940s	 CHP	 DP,	MP	
1990s	 CHP,	HADEP	 RP,	DP	
POST-2000	 CHP,	HDP	 AKP	
	
Today’s	Kemalist	and	Anti-Kemalist	parties	are	also	starting	to	divide	along	the	lines	of	
economic	 intervention	by	 the	government.	 	The	Kemalist	party	 (CHP)	 supports	a	 strong	state	
role	 in	 the	 economy	 because	 their	 supporters	 are	 entrepreneurs	 and	 businessmen	 running	
already	highly	industrialized	companies	who	have	benefitted	from	government	intervention	in	
the	past.		The	Anti-Kemalist	party	(AKP)	are,	of	course,	on	the	opposite	side.		They	support	the	
relaxation	of	state	control	of	the	economy.		Because	many	of	the	Islamic	Calvinists	living	in	the	
Anatolian	 Tiger	 provinces	 support	 the	 Anti-Kemalist	 party,	 provinces	 which	 are	 not	 yet	 fully	
industrialized,	they	support	deregulation	to	increase	economic	efficiency	and	success.			
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The	 Kemalist	 and	 Anti-Kemalist	 parties	 are	 not	 the	 only	 parties	 in	 Turkey.	 	 There	 are	
cleavages	other	 than	 that	between	 the	more	 secular	 and	Westernized	and	 the	more	 Islamic,	
traditional	 and	 patriarchal	 that	 affect	 the	 party	 system.	 	 The	 Kurds,	 an	 ethnic	 group	 in	
Southeastern	 Anatolian	 Turkey,	 have	 been	 fighting	 and	 negotiating	 for	 autonomy	 and	
independence	from	Turkey,	Syria,	Iraq	and	Iran,	the	four	countries	that	hold	the	majority	of	the	
world’s	 Kurds.	 	 To	 attempt	 to	 gain	 a	 political	 voice,	 the	 Kurds	 have	 consistently	 been	
represented	by	Kurdish	political	parties.		Historically,	they	have	not	succeeded	in	getting	many	
votes	outside	of	the	Kurdish	region	and	they	have	been	consistently	shut	down	by	the	army	and	
government.	 	 But,	 they	 add	 a	 new	 cleavage	 to	 Turkish	 party	 politics.	 	 Instead	 of	 the	 typical	
Turkish	secular	vs.	 Islamic	cleavage,	the	Kurds	add	a	national	vs.	separatist	division.	 	To	try	to	
gain	 national	 support	 from	 their	 Turkish	 counterparts,	 they	 also	 support	 other	 causes;	 like	
HADEP’s	support	for	green	industrialization	and	environmental	protection	and	HDP’s	support	of	
increased	 equality	 for	 women.	 	 For	 these	 reasons,	 HADEP	 and	 HDP	 are	 placed	 in	 the	
Modernizing	 column	 of	 the	 above	 table.	 	 For	 the	 first	 time,	 a	 Kurdish	 party,	 the	 HDP,	 won	
enough	 votes	 in	 both	 the	 June	 and	 November	 2015	 elections	 to	 have	 representation	 in	
Parliament,	 a	major	 victory	 for	 the	Kurdish	 separatist	movement	and	a	blow	 for	nationalistic	
Turks.	 	 These	 party	 political	 differences	 do	 indeed	 relate	 to	 Turkey’s	 geography	 of	 uneven	
development,	as	we	will	now	see.	
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Turkey’s	Contemporary	Electoral	Geography:	
	 In	Turkish	politics	today,	there	are	4	parties	that	receive	votes	across	the	country.		The	
AKP,	a	conservative,	mildly	Islamist	party,	is	the	main	party	and	has	been	since	its	2002	debut	
on	the	national	political	stage.		They	have	had	major	political	victories	and	usually	gain	such	a	
large	majority	 that	 they	 have	 the	 ability	 to	 change	 the	 constitution	 alone.	 	 Next,	 the	 CHP,	 a	
secular	and	liberal	party	is	the	main	opposition	and	have	not	won	a	major	victory	since	the	AKP	
gained	national	support.	 	The	MHP,	a	nationalistic,	 fundamentally	conservative	party,	and	the	
HDP,	 a	 Kurdish	 nationalist	 party,	 pick	 up	 the	 remainder	 of	 the	 votes	 and	 because	 of	 their	
relatively	small	support	base	and	percentages	of	votes	gained,	they	will	only	be	briefly	included	
in	 this	 analysis.	 	 Per	 usual,	 the	 majority	 of	 these	 Turkish	 parties	 have	 a	 specific	 geographic	
support	base.		The	CHP	gains	most	of	their	votes	from	the	Western	cities	of	Turkey,	the	MHP	in	
Central	 South	Anatolia,	 and	 the	HDP	dominates	 in	 the	Kurdish	 regions	of	East	and	Southeast	
Anatolia.			
The	AKP,	though,	is	the	outlier	from	the	traditional	electoral	geography	of	Turkey.		It	has	
a	large	support	base	across	the	country,	even	in	the	areas	where	the	other	three	parties	have	
strongholds.		As	listed	above	in	other	sections,	this	is	because	of	the	presence	of	the	Anatolian	
Tiger	provinces	and	the	Islamic	Calvinists	that	these	provinces	produce	and	migrants	from	rural	
Turkey	who	move	to	the	Western	cities	and	bring	their	traditional	values	with	them.			
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Figure	4:	AKP	%	vs.	CHP	%	
	
	
Overall,	the	AKP	party	does	remarkably	well	in	every	region	of	Turkey	compared	to	the	
CHP.		Notice	the	numbers	on	each	axis,	both	x	and	y,	on	the	above	graph.		One	can	see	that	the	
CHP	axis	starts	at	10%	and	stops	at	50%,	even	though	none	of	the	regions	actually	reach	that	
high	of	a	percentage	in	support.	 	The	AKP,	on	the	x	axis,	shows	a	much	different	story.	 	Their	
axis	starts	at	30%,	with	every	region	supporting	the	AKP	with	at	 least	35%	of	their	votes,	and	
ends	 at	 60%.	 	 Even	 the	 HDP’s	 support	 is	 evident	 on	 this	 graph.	 	 The	 group	 of	 three	 at	 the	
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bottom	 left	 corner	 of	 the	 graph	 (Southeast,	 Northeast,	 and	 Central	 East	 Anatolia)	 are	 the	
strongholds	of	HDP	 support,	 and	while	 they	 still	 give	 the	AKP	a	 large	percentage	of	 support,	
they	complicate	the	party	politics	of	Turkey.			
	
HDP	Support	in	Southeastern	Anatolia:	
As	stated	above,	the	HDP	is	the	ethnic	Kurdish	party,	and	after	having	passed	the	10%	
threshold	to	gain	seats	 in	Turkey’s	parliament,	has	a	growing	political	voice	and	power	 in	the	
country.	 	 In	 the	 Southeast	 Anatolian,	 Northeast	 Anatolia,	 and	 Central	 East	 Anatolia	 regions,	
Kurdish	 party	 support	 is	 extremely	 high	 due	 to	 the	 high	 percentage	 of	 ethnic	 Kurds.	 	 These	
regions	also	score	the	lowest	on	the	development	index	and	if	they	were	to	vote	for	the	AKP	in	
large	numbers,	then	a	stronger	relationship	between	AKP	support	and	development	would	be	
apparent.		But	how	can	one	assume	that	AKP	support	in	the	Kurdish	regions	would	grow	if	the	
HDP	did	not	exist?	 	There	are	a	number	of	 reasons.	 	First,	Kurds	are	conservative,	 traditional	
Muslims,	 and	 many	 of	 their	 Islamic	 values	 are	 present	 in	 the	 AKP’s	 platform.	 	 Second,	 by	
comparing	CHP	and	AKP	support	in	the	Kurdish	regions	in	Turkey’s	2015	elections,	the	AKP	still	
manages	to	get	30%	more	votes	than	the	CHP	does.		Therefore,	one	can	assume	that	if	the	HDP	
did	 not	 exist,	 the	 AKP’s	 vote	 percentage	 in	 the	 Kurdish	 regions	 would	 rise,	 and	 thereby	
strengthening	the	relationship	between	the	AKP	and	development.			
	 In	order	to	test	these	statements	to	be	true,	we	plotted	the	development	indexes	for	all	
twelve	 of	 the	NUTS	 regions	 of	 Turkey	 and	party	 support.	 	 Below	 are	 three	 graphs	 exhibiting	
party	support	and	levels	of	development	for	the	CHP,	the	AKP,	and	the	AKP	+	the	HDP,	the	two	
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conservative	 parties	 of	 2015	 Turkish	 politics.	 	 Combining	 the	 vote	 percentage	 for	 the	 two	
parties	in	one	analysis	then	provides	a	look	at	the	conservative	Turkish	party	vote	and	support	
base	and	the	level	of	development	for	the	regions	that	voted	conservatively,	either	AKP	or	HDP,	
in	the	November	2015	elections.			
Figure	5:	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Figure	6:	
CORRELATION:	0.905	
	
	
	
	
	
2.5
7.7
37
1.7
5.5
11.2
48.2
4
50.6
4
5.5
1.6
13.4 13.4
13.4
Aegean
Mediterranean
Central Anatolia
West Anatolia
West Black Sea
Southeast Anatolia
Centraleast Anatolia
Northeast Anatolia
East Marmara East Black Sea
West Marmara
West Marmara
Istanbul
Istanbul
¯Percentage of Votes for HDP in NUTS RegionsLegend
Percent Votes HDP
1.600000 - 10.000000
10.000001 - 19.000000
19.000001 - 29.000000
29.000001 - 39.000000
39.000001 - 50.600000
19	
	
The	above	graph	exhibits	the	almost	perfect	relationship	between	level	of	development	
of	 a	 region	 (determined	 by	 using	 the	 development	 index)	 and	 CHP	 party	 support.	 	 As	 CHP	
support	grows	higher,	 the	 level	of	development	does	as	well.	 	The	graph	supports	 the	claims	
made	 earlier	 in	 the	 section,	 that	 the	 CHP	 has	 a	 very	 geographical	 support	 base	 of	Western,	
urban	Turks.		
	
Figure	7:		
CORRELATION:	0.206	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
The	 graph	 above	 is	 evidence	 for	 the	 claim	made	 that	 the	 AKP’s	 support	 base	 is	 not	
geographically	 concentrated	 and	 is	 strong	 across	 the	 various	 regions.	 	 The	 AKP	 has	 a	 strong	
support	with	 regions	 of	 varying	 development	 levels	 and,	 as	 pictured,	 does	 not	 receive	 lower	
than	 30%	 of	 the	 vote	 in	 any	 region	 of	 Turkey.	 	 The	 AKP	 is	 extremely	 successful	 in	 gaining	
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support	across	the	country,	yet	because	of	 the	presence	of	Kurdish	separatist	parties	 like	the	
HDP,	 they	 lose	 in	 the	 less	developed	 regions.	 	 This	 leads	 to	 a	 lack	of	 a	 relationship	between	
underdevelopment	and	AKP	support.			
	
Figure	8:	
CORRELATION:	-0.880	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
The	above	graph	gives	one	a	view	of	the	total	conservative	vote	 in	Turkey,	and	how	it	
correlates	 to	 levels	of	 development	 in	 the	NUTS	 regions.	 	As	 seen	 from	 the	graph,	 the	more	
conservative	support	a	region	has,	the	less	developed	it	is	on	the	development	index.		This	also	
proves	 the	prediction	of	uneven	development,	 and	 that	 Turkish	development	 is	 geographical	
and	relevant	to	conservative	party	support.			
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III.	The	Anatolian	Tiger	Phenomenon	
	 The	purpose	of	this	thesis	is	to	explain	why	the	AKP	is	successful	across	different	regions	
of	Turkey.		In	the	regions	of	Central	Turkey,	Anatolian	Tiger	provinces	provide	large	percentages	
of	support	for	the	AKP,	as	noted	in	voting	statistics.		Others	have	noted	a	connection	between	
the	AKP	and	the	Tigers,	but	this	section	aims	to	explain	why	this	connection	occurs.			
An	Anatolian	Tiger,	contrary	to	its	name,	is	not	a	Turkish	member	of	the	big	cat	family.		
Instead,	 an	 Anatolian	 Tiger	 is	 the	 name	 for	 any	 of	 the	 rapidly	 industrializing	 Central	 Turkish	
cities	and	regions.		According	to	one	site’s	definition,	the	term	also	refers	to	large	numbers	of	
entrepreneurs	 and	 a	 growing	 middle	 class	 in	 these	 newly	 industrializing	 regions	
(Investopedia.com).		Their	origin	goes	back	to	Turkey’s	1980’s	policy	changes	toward	economic	
liberalization.	 This	 created	 a	 space	 for	 investment	 and	 growth	 in	 regions	 that	 were	 still	
dominated	by	an	agrarian	way	of	life.		Since	these	changes	in	economic	policy,	some	of	Turkey’s	
Central	Anatolian	 regions	are	 industrializing,	 the	economy	and	middle	 class	 are	 growing,	 and	
urbanization	 is	expanding.	 	The	populations	of	 the	Tiger	provinces	are	also	quickly	growing,	a	
consequence	 of	 the	 industrialization	 and	 urbanization	 that	 they	 are	 experiencing.	 	 This	
population	increase	is	obvious	in	Table	2,	located	below.		This	table	analyzes	populations	of	the	
capital	 cities	 of	 the	 Tigers	 in	 1990	 and	 2014	 and	 then	 calculates	 the	 percent	 increase.	 	 This	
reflects	the	growth	experienced	 in	the	Tigers,	as	one	can	see	that	the	province	to	experience	
the	 lowest	 percent	 increase	 of	 growth	 still	 grew	 by	 48.46%.	 	 One	 can	 also	 see	 that	 the	
population	growth	of	the	Tigers’	capital	cities	helped	increase	the	urban	population	of	Turkey	
as	 a	whole.	 	 The	businesses	 that	have	 succeeded	 in	 the	 Tiger	provinces	 since	 the	1980’s	 are	
being	 run	 by	 a	 new	 class	 of	 Muslim	 entrepreneurs	 called	 the	 “Islamic	 Calvinists”.	 	 These	
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businessmen	assist	 in	 the	 industrialization	of	 the	Tiger	provinces	and	continue	the	use	of	 the	
Islamic	values	in	their	businesses	and	communities.		They	contribute	their	economic	success	to	
these	 Islamic	values,	 therefore	taking	a	name	a	played	off	of	Protestant	Calvinism	of	 the	18th	
century.	 	 	But	they	also	express	a	non-secular	business	practice	that	Western	Turks	and	other	
countries	have	not	 seen	 from	Turkey;	 something	contrary	 to	 the	Western	 idea	of	 the	secular	
business	person.			
	
Table	2:	Tiger	Capital	Cities’	Population	Increases	from	1990-2014	
Anatolian	Tigers:	 Capital	Cities:	 Population	1990:	 Population	2014:	 Population	Increase:	
Denizli	 Denizli	 203,741	 557,300	 173.53%	
Gaziantep	 Gaziantep	 603,434	 1,510,270	 150.28%	
Kayseri	 Kayseri	 425,776	 904,699	 112.48%	
Balikesir	 Balikesir	 170,011	 272,569	 60.32%	
Konya	 Konya	 513,346	 1,174,536	 128.80%	
K.	Maras	 Kahraman	 228,129	 475,793	 108.56%	
Ordu	 Ordu	 102,107	 154,895	 51.70%	
Samsun	 Samsun	 304,176	 541,330	 77.97%	
Çorum	 Corum	 116,810	 243,698	 108.63%	
Trabzon	 Trabzon	 161,886	 240,333	 48.46%	
Kütahya	 Kutahya	 130,944	 232,123	 77.27%	
Nigde	 Nigde	 55,035	 127,980	 132.54%	
Adiyaman	 Adiyaman	 100,045	 230,630	 130.53%	
Afyon	 Afyon	 95,643	 209,406	 118.95%	
Çankiri	 Cankiri	 45,496	 76,490	 68.12%	
Giresun	 Giresun	 67,604	 105,748	 56.42%	
Isparta	 Isparta	 112,117	 207,266	 84.87%	
Karaman	 Karaman	 76,525	 148,362	 93.87%	
Kocaeli	 Izmit	 190,741	 310,973	 63.03%	
Malatya	 Malatya	 270,412	 438,000	 61.98%	
Turkey	Total	 Ankara	 59%	Urban	 73%	Urban	 23.72%	
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Table	3:	AKP	vs.	CHP	Support	in	the	Anatolian	Tiger	Provinces	
Anatolian	Tigers		 %AKP	 %CHP	 Ratio	CHP	to	AKP	
Denizli	 39.78	 34.76	 87.38%	
Gaziantep	 47.03	 16.37	 34.81%	
Kayseri	 52.35	 12.54	 23.95%	
Balikesir	 39.12	 33.67	 86.07%	
Konya	 65.09	 9.91	 15.22%	
K.	Maras	 60.76	 8.72	 14.35%	
Ordu	 52.92	 28.21	 53.31%	
Samsun	 52.86	 22.99	 43.49%	
Çorum	 54.28	 22.28	 41.05%	
Trabzon	 55.29	 17.01	 30.76%	
Kütahya	 54.49	 12.01	 22.04%	
Nigde	 47.9	 21.29	 44.45%	
Adiyaman	 58	 11.49	 19.81%	
Afyon	 52.3	 16.75	 32.03%	
Çankiri	 59.2	 6.9	 11.65%	
Giresun	 53.46	 21.91	 40.98%	
Isparta	 44.24	 22.15	 50.07%	
Karaman	 55.4	 15.55	 28.07%	
Kocaeli	 46.38	 24.24	 52.26%	
Malatya	 58.42	 16.61	 28.43%	
	
The	Tigers	tend	to	have	high	AKP	voting	percentages,	especially	relative	to	the	CHP.	Why	
does	this	connection	occur?	 	There	are	two	possible	reasons	for	AKP	popularity	 in	the	Tigers.		
First,	rapid	economic	growth	in	these	provinces	has	been	associated	with	a	period	of	AKP	rule	
and	 the	 Tigers’	 see	 AKP	 policies	 as	 beneficial	 to	 their	 success.	 	 Second	 is	 an	 Islamic	 form	 of	
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integration	of	the	people	moving	from	the	countryside	to	the	Tigers	that	has	been	promoted	by	
the	Islamic	Calvinists.	 	This	is	referred	to	here	as	Islamic	urbanization.		While	this	new	type	of	
urbanization	has	benefitted	 the	 Islamic	Calvinists	 in	 their	promotion	of	 Islamic	values	 in	 their	
communities	and	businesses,	it	also	assists	the	AKP,	as	it	is	seen	as	a	mildly	Islamist	party.		As	
seen	 in	 Table	 3	 above,	 the	 Tigers’	 average	AKP	 vote	 percentage	 is	 also	 higher	 than	 Turkey’s	
entire	 average,	 suggesting	 that	 the	 AKP	 and	 the	 Tigers	 have	 a	 strong	 connection.	 	 The	 CHP,	
though,	is	clearly	lacking	this	connection.		In	8	of	the	19	provinces	listed	in	the	table	below,	the	
ratio	of	CHP	percentage	to	AKP	percentage	is	less	than	30%:	a	large	difference	between	the	two	
parties,	therefore.		This	again	exhibits	the	significance	of	the	AKP/Tiger	connection	
	 	When	the	Turkish	Republic	was	founded	in	1923,	a	state	run	economy	and	strict	control	
over	the	private	sector	were	used	to	induce	the	development	of	infrastructure	and	to	promote	
economic	prosperity.		These	did	not	succeed	as	planned,	though.		Things	started	to	change	with	
Democratic	 Party	 rule	 in	 the	 early	 1950’s:	 agricultural	 development	 was	 emphasized,	 taxes	
lowered,	and	major	road	and	other	infrastructure	projects	were	implemented.		The	agriculture	
tax	decrease	allowed	farmers	to	spend	more	money	and	mechanize	their	farming	techniques,	
while	 newly	 constructed	 roadways	 connected	 villages	 and	 cities	 spurred	 growth	 that	
unindustrialized	 areas	 had	 not	 yet	 seen.	 	 Import-substitution	 policies	 were	 implemented	 to	
assist	 with	 development	 and	 protect	 new	 businesses	 and	 industries	 against	 foreign	
competition.	 	 But	 when	 private	 investment	 did	 not	 increase	 as	 the	 party	 had	 hoped,	 and	
inflation	increased	due	to	growth	in	the	money	supply,	the	Turkish	economy	suffered	and	the	
Democratic	Party	 lost	control	after	a	1960	military	coup.	 	The	Turkish	economy	then	suffered	
throughout	 the	1960s-70s	due	 to	 the	 failure	of	 the	 import-substitution	program	 to	 speed	up	
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development	 across	 the	 country,	 until	 complete	 economic	 liberalization	 and	
internationalization	 were	 implemented	 in	 the	 1980s.	 	 Small-scale	 Anatolian	 businesses	 may	
have	 been	 the	 biggest	 beneficiaries	 from	 the	 emphasis	 of	 these	 internationalization	 and	
liberalization	 policies	 on	 the	 export	 of	 manufactured	 goods.	 	 The	 cities	 that	 would	 become	
known	 as	 the	 Anatolian	 Tigers	 were	 particularly	 advantaged:	 “dynamic,	 highly	 computerized	
and	newly	equipped…”	with	flexible	production	patterns	to	meet	demand	(Karakaya).			
The	AKP	has	embraced	these	economic	policies,	and	accordingly	assisted	in	opening	up	
foreign	markets	 for	Turkish	business;	 the	 same	 internationalization	 that	 the	 Islamic	Calvinists	
are	in	favor	of	and	see	as	crucial	for	the	continued	growth	of	the	Tigers.		The	AKP’s	support	for	
Turkish	 membership	 in	 the	 European	 Union	 exhibits	 their	 commitment	 to	 the	
internationalization	 of	 the	 Tigers’	 markets,	 since	 membership	 would	 eliminate	 the	 barriers	
which	currently	limit	entry	of	Turkish	products	into	the	EU.		
These	economic	policy	positions,	 though,	deepen	the	divide	between	the	AKP	and	the	
CHP.	 	 This	 division	 has	 its	 origins	 in	 the	 Kemalist	 development	 and	 Westernization	 policies	
instituted	after	the	formation	of	the	Turkish	Republic.		These	policies	forced	a	Westernization,	
secularization	 and	 modernization	 of	 Turkey’s	 citizens,	 which	 the	 city	 residents	 tended	 to	
support	and	the	more	traditional	Anatolian	residents	struggled	to	implement.		The	CHP,	known	
as	a	Kemalist	party,	carries	with	 it	 the	consequences	of	 the	Kemalist	policies	 implemented	at	
the	Republic’s	formation.		This	divides	the	AKP,	supported	in	large	part	by	the	more	traditional	
Anatolian	Turks,	from	the	CHP,	the	party	known	to	have	complicated	their	livelihoods.		The	CHP	
has	 also	 had	 difficulties	 gaining	 popularity	 in	 the	 Tigers	 due	 to	 their	 support	 of	 economic	
policies	 that	 benefit	 Western	 cities.	 	 These	 cities,	 already	 industrialized	 and	 economically	
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prosperous	support	industry	protectionist	policies.		Because	their	goods	and	services	are	mainly	
produced	 for	 Turkey’s	domestic	market	 and	 tourism	 industries,	 they	also	do	not	 support	 the	
same	internationalization	policies	and	EU	integration	that	the	AKP	and	the	Tigers	do.		The	CHP	
did	not	adapt	their	economic	policies	to	support	the	business	wants	of	the	newly	risen	Islamic	
Calvinists,	who	 are	 not	 in	 favor	 of	 and	 do	 not	 benefit	 from	protectionist	 policies.	 	 	 The	 CHP	
followed	this	strategy	because	they	did	not	want	to	lose	their	Western	urban	support.				
		 AKP	support	for	free	trade	has	been	a	threat	to	the	industries	of	Western	Turkey	as	well.		
These	 free	 trade	 agreements	 with	 other	 countries	 require	 quid	 pro	 quos	 which	 open	 up	
Turkey’s	market	 to	 foreign	 competition.	 	 The	older,	 longer	 established	 industries	 of	Western	
Turkey	stand	to	be	hurt	by	this	because	of	their	markets’	historical	roots	in	Turkey	itself.		These	
industries	do	not	want	cheaper	products	from	other	countries	undercutting	their	prices.		Now,	
the	AKP	and	CHP	are	divided	by	both	a	secular/Islamist	cleavage,	and	an	economic	one.		
	 This	 economic	 divide	 is	 apparent	 in	 the	 structure	 of	 business	 associations	 in	 Turkey.		
There	are	two	main	business	associations,	TUSIAD	and	MUSIAD.		TUSIAD	(Turkish	Industry	and	
Business	Association)	 supports	 their	members,	 the	majority	of	whom	are	 located	 in	Western	
Turkish	 cities,	 by	 fighting	 for	 the	protectionist	 economic	policies	 that	Western	 industries	 and	
companies	benefit	from.		They	also	claim	to	be	representatives	of	Turkey’s	secular	elite.		These	
policies,	 though,	 do	 not	 support	 the	 rising	 Anatolian	 Tigers	 and	 the	 values	 or	 wants	 of	 the	
Islamic	Calvinists,	and	TUSIAD	did	not	adapt	themselves	to	include	the	Anatolian	businesses.		In	
response	to	their	exclusion,	the	Islamic	Calvinists	and	other	Anatolian	businessmen	formed	the	
Independent	Industrialists	and	Businessmen	Association,	MUSIAD.		While	it	 is	not	inherently	a	
religious	 organization,	 MUSIAD	 is	 commonly	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 Muslim	 Industrialists	 and	
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Businessmen	Association,	due	to	the	religious	preferences	and	business	practices	of	many	of	its	
members.	 	MUSIAD	 gives	 the	 previously	 excluded	Anatolian	 businessmen	 a	 voice	 in	 Turkey’s	
economic	and	labor	policies.		
	 The	 AKP	 have	 been	 prominent	 supporters	 of	 MUSIAD	 since	 its	 formation	 in	 1990.		
Because	 the	AKP	and	MUSIAD	support	economic	 liberalization	and	 Islamic	business	practices,	
MUSIAD’s	 formation	 gave	 the	 AKP	 another	 platform	 for	 political	 success.	 	 While	 TUSIAD	
businesses	 are	 largely	 supporters	 of	 the	 CHP,	 the	 AKP	 gives	 MUSIAD	 members	 a	 way	 to	
counteract	 TUSIAD’s	 influence	 on	 national	 economic	 policy.	 	 The	 AKP	 and	 TUSIAD	 have	 also	
gotten	 into	 public	 disputes,	 like	 in	 January	 2014.	 	 In	 a	 speech	 to	 TUSIAD’s	 44th	 General	
Assembly,	the	Chairman	commented	that	due	to	Turkey’s	recent	stray	from	the	rule	of	law	and	
use	of	tax	penalties	to	pressure	companies	to	support	certain	policies,	foreign	investment	will	
decrease	and	Turkey	will	lose	money.		Erdogan,	President	of	Turkey	and	the	leader	of	the	AKP,	
reacted	 to	 this	 statement	 by	 accusing	 the	 Chairman	 of	 treason	 and	 said	 “From	 now	 on,	 we	
won’t	assist	you,	but	will	impede	you”	(Gursel).		Table	3	below	shows	the	percentage	of	TUSIAD	
and	 MUSIAD	 members	 in	 provinces	 around	 Turkey.	 	 This	 is	 an	 important	 table,	 because	 it	
portrays	a	greater	diversity	of	MUSIAD	members	from	a	range	of	provinces	in	all	regions	of	the	
country.	 	 It	 also	 gives	 the	 ratio	 of	 MUSIAD	 members	 in	 a	 province	 to	 TUSIAD	 members,	
reflecting	differences	 in	business	practices	and	party	 support	based	 in	provinces.	 	Where	 the	
ratio	 is	above	1,	TUSIAD	membership	 is	greater	 than	MUSIAD.	 	Below	1	 is	 the	opposite.	 	The	
provinces	with	a	ratio	above	1	are	largely	located	in	Western	Turkey,	including	Adana,	Eskisehir,	
Izmir,	Ankara,	 and,	most	of	 all,	 Istanbul.	 	Most	of	 TUSIAD’s	members	are	 located	 in	 Istanbul,	
Turkey’s	main	 industrial	center,	but	 there	 is	still	a	 large	MUSIAD	representation	 in	the	city	as	
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well.	 	This	suggests	 that	 there	are	 industries	and	businesses	 in	 Istanbul	 that	benefit	 from	the	
AKP’s	 economic	 policies.	 	 Judging	 from	 the	 ratios	 below	 1,	 MUSIAD	 support	 is	 higher	 than	
TUSIAD	in	Central	Anatolian	provinces,	including	the	Tigers.	
Table	4:	TUSIAD	vs.	MUSIAD	in	Turkish	Provinces	
Province:	 %TUSIAD	Members	 %MUSIAD	Members	 	TUSIAD	/	MUSIAD	
Adana	 2.95	 1.63	 1.81	
Ankara	 5.07	 10.19	 0.49	
Antalya	 0.42	 0	 		
Balikesir	 0	 4.83	 		
Bilecek	 0.63	 0	 		
Bolu	 0	 0.06	 		
Burdur	 0	 0.06	 		
Bursa		 1.06	 5.77	 0.18	
Çankiri	 0	 1.63	 		
Çorum	 0	 0.99	 		
Denizli	 0	 4.37	 		
Erzurum	 0	 0.06	 		
Eskisehir	 1.06	 0.06	 17.67	
Gaziantep	 0	 3.55	 		
Isparta	 0	 0.06	 		
Hatay	 0	 0.12	 		
Istanbul	 68.29	 28.42	 2.40	
Izmir	 12.9	 6.64	 1.94	
K.	Maras	 0	 3.15	 		
Karaman	 0	 0.35	 		
Kayseri	 0	 6.52	 		
Kirklareli	 0.42	 0	 		
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Kocaeli	 0.85	 5.18	 0.16	
Konya	 3.59	 8.91	 0.40	
Malatya	 0	 2.04	 		
Manisa	 1.27	 1.46	 0.87	
Sakarya	 0.21	 0	 		
Samsun	 0	 1.28	 		
Sanliurfa	 0	 0.93	 		
Sinop	 0.21	 0	 		
Tekirdag	 0.21	 0.12	 1.75	
Tokat	 0	 0.06	 		
Yozgat	 0	 0.12	 		
Zonguldak	 0	 1.46	 		
	
	 There	 is	nevertheless	some	geographic	difference	 in	TUSIAD	and	MUSIAD	support	due	
to	their	association	with	certain	types	of	businesses.		TUSIAD,	whose	members	are	mainly	long	
established	Western	Turkish	businesses	that	follow	the	secular	business	policies,	has	members	
mainly	 located	 in	 the	major	 Turkish	 cities	 of	 Istanbul,	 Ankara,	 and	 Izmir,	 and	 some	 in	 other	
Western	 Turkish	 provinces.	 	 MUSIAD,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 has	 a	 more	 diverse	 membership,	
ranging	from	businesses	is	Western	Turkey	to	the	Tiger	provinces.		Below	you	will	find	two		
maps	 of	 TUSIAD	 and	 MUSIAD	 membership	 in	 provinces	 across	 Turkey,	 and	 which	 of	 the	
provinces	 in	 both	 maps	 are	 Tiger	 provinces.	 	 These	 maps	 also	 are	 evidence	 of	 MUSIAD’s	
relationship	 with	 the	 Tiger	 provinces,	 if	 a	 somewhat	 nuanced	 relationship,	 and	 reflect	 the	
economic	divide	between	the	AKP	and	CHP.			
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	 In	 conclusion,	 Table	5	below	divides	 the	AKP	and	CHP	by	 their	 economic	policy,	main	
support	base,	and	business	association	connection.		The	AKP	is	so	popular	in	Central	Turkey	and	
the	Tiger	provinces	because	of	their	economic	policies,	and	therefore	is	also	supported	by	the	
Tigers’	business	association,	MUSIAD.			
Figure	9:	
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Table	5:	Economic	Policy	and	Party	Support	in	Turkey	
	
	
	
	
Islamic	Urbanization:	
The	Islamic	Calvinists,	though,	are	not	the	only	reason	that	AKP	support	is	so	high	in	the	
Anatolian	 Tiger	 provinces.	 	 There	 are	 noticeable	 trends	 that	 are	 important	 to	 discuss	 when	
acknowledging	 the	 high	 percentages	 of	 votes	 for	 the	 AKP	 in	 these	 provinces.	 	 First,	 living	
standards	have	increased	rapidly	 in	the	Anatolian	Tigers	as	a	result	of	their	economic	growth.		
These	 living	 standard	upgrades	have	 taken	place	during	 the	AKP’s	 tenure,	potentially	 leading	
these	 Turks	 to	 vote	 with	 their	 pocket-books	 and	 follow	 the	 “why	 fix	 what	 isn’t	 broken?”	
mindset.		Second,	rapid	economic	growth	has	led	to	rapid	urbanization	of	Anatolian	Tiger	cities.		
This	 urbanization	 has	 created	 higher	 levels	 of	 in-migration	 to	 the	 cities	 on	 the	 part	 of	 Turks	
living	 in	 less	 urbanized	 and	 developed	 towns	 and	 regions.	 	 These	migrants	 are,	 on	 average,	
more	religious	and	traditional,	and	therefore	would	be	more	likely	to	vote	for	an	Islamist	party.		
Third,	 the	 Islamic	 practices	 of	 imece	 and	 himaye	 help	 spread	 AKP	 support	 throughout	 their	
employees	and	community	members.		Imece	refers	to	the	“collaboration	and	support	within	a	
social	group,	originally	the	village	community”	while	himaye	is	“a	vertical	principle	of	protection	
by	 and	 loyalty	 to	 the	 family,	 the	 religious	 group	 or	 brotherhood,	 or	 the	 region	 of	 origin”	
	 AKP	 CHP	
Economic	policy	 Free	trade	 Protectionist	
Heartland	of	support	 Central	Turkey	 Western	Turkey	
Major	business	association	 MUSIAD	 TUSIAD	
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(Joppien).	 	 These	 values	 are	 practiced	 for	 a	 sense	 of	 comradery	 between	 Muslims	 in	 a	
community	or	workplace.		Employers	in	Islamic	Calvinist	businesses	regularly	take	on	a	paternal	
role	 towards	 their	 employees,	 and	 through	 these	 roles,	 they	 spread	 traditional	 values	 and,	
therefore,	make	the	masses	more	sympathetic	to	the	AKP’s	Islamist	cause.		Brotherhood	is	not	
the	only	 goal	 of	 imece	 and	himaye,	 though.	 	 They	 are	 also	 used	 to	 preempt	 labor	 unrest	 by	
creating	a	sense	of	dependency	and	friendship.			
	
III.	The	Politics	of	Difference	
	 In	any	society,	people	carry	with	them	understandings	of	how	their	society	is	structured.		
Often	there	is	a	dominant	view	that	people	incorporate,	a	view	which	gives	a	privileged	position	
to	some	in	respect	to	others.		An	example	of	this	is	gender.		Men	are	considered	the	dominant	
gender:	they	are	considered	as	stronger,	smarter,	and	the	major	bread	winners,	leaving	women	
to	 be	 the	 weaker,	 more	 emotionally	 driven	 of	 the	 two	 genders	 and	 who	 exist	 primarily	 as	
homemakers	–	and	should!	 	These	understandings	have	been	constructed	over	time,	often	 in	
such	 a	 way	 as	 to	 work	 to	 the	 advantage	 of	 those	 who	 have	 been	 able	 to	 prevail	 in	 their	
construction.	 	 These	 privileges	 then	 get	 normalized	 and	 so	 perpetuate	 advantage	 and	
disadvantage	between	groups.			
	 This	 can	generate	what	 is	 called	a	politics	of	difference.	This	 is	usually	experienced	 in	
two	movements.	 	The	first	movement	is	the	creation	of	the	“other”.	 	Here,	a	group	in	power,	
usually	with	better	 education	and	money,	defines	 a	 group	of	people	 in	 a	negative	way.	 	 The	
“other”	is	considered	to	be,	for	example,	lacking,	uneducated	and	backward.		This	definition	is	
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used	as	a	justification	of	the	privilege	that	one	group	experiences	over	the	“other”.		Members	
of	this	privileged	group	attributes	their	success	to,	for	example,	their	hard	work,	and	claims	that	
if	 the	 “other”	 had	 worked	 as	 hard,	 they	 too	 would	 be	 successful.	 	 Social	 constraints	 and	
discriminations	 are	 not	 taken	 into	 account	 in	 explaining	 the	 economic	 and	 social	 disparities	
between	 the	 two	 groups;	 rather	 some	 fundamental	 ‘difference’	 attributable	 to	 personal	
shortcomings,	like	race,	is	used	to	justify	that	discrimination.			
The	second	movement	in	the	politics	of	difference	is	the	empowerment	of	the	“other”.		
In	this	movement,	the	“other”	stigmatized	group	defines	a	new	identity	for	itself	and	uses	the	
traits	and	values	that	the	privileged	group	stereotyped	them	for	as	a	way	to	prompt	pride	and	a	
creation	of	a	new,	counter	 identity.	 	This	 identity	 is	based	on	a	 redefinition	of	who	 they	are,	
denying	the	claims	of	 the	privileged	group	about	 them.	 	They	provide	a	different	explanation	
for	why	they	are	not	the	privileged	group	themselves,	placing	the	blame	on	the	exploitive	and	
discriminatory	 actions	 of	 the	 privileged.	 	 The	 stigmatized	 group	 demonstrates	 their	 own	
worthiness	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 past	 and	 present	 contributions	 to	 society:	 artists,	 businessmen,	
politicians,	etc.		
	 Turkey’s	modern	 day	 politics	 of	 difference	 stems	originally	 from	 the	 formation	 of	 the	
Turkish	Republic	 in	 1923.	 	 The	 Young	 Turks,	 a	 group	of	 young,	 nationalist,	 liberal,	 secularists	
staged	a	revolution	against	the	Ottoman	Empire	after	its	defeat	in	World	War	I.		They	formed	a	
new	government	and	eventually	banned	the	Ottoman	caliphate.	 	This	banning	also	 led	to	the	
dissolution	of	many	Islamic	institutions	in	Turkey,	from	schools	to	law	courts.		The	new,	secular	
government,	run	by	a	general	named	Mustafa	Kemal,	also	banned	Islamic	dress	in	public	places,	
created	 a	 new	 Turkish	 language	 with	 the	 Roman	 alphabet,	 and	 changed	 Turkey’s	 calendar	
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system	 to	 Gregorian.	 	 These	 were	 influential,	 rapid	 changes	 that	 had	 large	 effects	 on	 the	
Turkish	society.	
After	the	banning	of	many	Islamic	institutions,	conservative	rural	Muslims	across	Turkey	
were	forced	to	adapt	to	the	secular,	modernizing	policies.		Very	suddenly,	they	could	not	speak,	
educate,	 or	 dress	 as	 they	 had	 previously	 been	 doing.	 	 They	 were	 stigmatized	 by	 the	 urban,	
secular	Turks	 for	 resisting	 the	westernizing	changes	 that	Mustafa	Kemal	enforced	while	 long-
term	city	 residents,	on	 the	other	hand,	easily	adapted	to	his	policies.	 	The	changes	created	a	
difference	between	two	groups	of	people:	conservative	rural	Muslims	and	urban,	secular	Turks.		
The	 urban,	 secular	 Turks	were	 thereby	 placed	 at	 an	 advantage	 and	 justified	 this	 in	 terms	 of	
Western	virtues	that	others	lacked:	enlightenment,	rational,	even	civilized.		
The	 politics	 of	 difference	 creates	 two	movements.	 	 The	 first	 is	 stigmatization	 of	 one	
group	by	another,	as	shown	above.		The	second	is	the	stigmatized	group’s	counter-movement.		
This	 counter-movement	 was	 present	 in	 Turkish	 society	 through	 the	 formation	 of	 Islamic,	
conservative	political	parties.		Because	Mustafa	Kemal	and	the	Young	Turks	based	the	Republic	
on	secular	policies,	successive	Islamist	political	parties	were	often	shut	down	by	the	(Kemalist)	
military.		But	the	AKP	has	been	a	part	of	the	Anti-Kemalist	counter-movement,	and	because	of	
its	economic	and	political	success,	has	not	been	banned.			
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Long-term	Residents	vs.	Rural	migrants	in	Western	Turkish	cities:	
The	politics	of	difference	and	the	creation	of	the	“other”	are	widely	apparent	in	the	Western,	
industrialized	cities	of	Turkey.		There	are	two	distinct	groups	at	play	in	these	politics:	the	long-
term	residents	who	have	 lived	 in	 the	cities	 for	generations,	or	migrants	who	adapted	quicker	
than	 the	 average	 rural	 migrant	 does;	 and	 then	 the	 rural	 migrants	 or	 the	 children	 of	 rural	
migrants.		There	are	a	few	ways	that	these	groups	experience	separation,	all	to	the	advantage	
of	 the	 urban	 Turks.	 	 The	 rural	 Turks	 are	 seen	 as	 uneducated,	 conservative,	 traditional,	 and	
backwards	 by	 the	 long-term	 city	 residents,	 who	 thereby	 justify	 their	 economic	 and	 social	
privilege.		The	urban	context	exaggerates	the	stereotypes	that	the	groups	give	to	others	due	to	
their	extremely	close	contact.		The	rural	Turks	see	the	urban	Turks	as	cut-throat,	value-less,	and	
pretentious	capitalists.		Both	groups	want	a	degree	of	separation,	both	material	and	symbolic,	
from	each	other,	and	through	housing	locations,	job	options,	and	politics,	they	achieve	it.	
Another	expression	of	the	politics	of	difference	in	Western	Turkish	cities	is	between	the	
White	Turks	and	Black	Turks.		This	deepens	the	sense	of	difference	between	the	rural	migrants	
and	 long-term	 residents,	 and	 the	 AKP	 and	 CHP,	 in	 Western	 Turkish	 cities.	 	 While	 racist	
connotations	are	 clearly	present	 in	 these	name	choices,	 and	 “Black	Turk”	 is	used	 to	 create	a	
social	class	association	for	the	people	who	are	awarded	the	label,	both	are	considered	negative	
depending	on	who	is	using	it.	 	“White	Turks”	are	usually	urban	people	who	are	considered	by	
the	opposite	group	pretentious	and	arrogant,	while	“Black	Turks”	are	rural	Turks	thought	to	be	
uneducated	and	unlawful.		Because	“White	Turks”	are	normally	the	long-term	residents	of	the	
Western	Turkish	cities	and	the	“Black	Turks”	are	Anatolian	and	rural	migrant	Turks,	the	AKP	and	
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CHP	make	 use	 of	 these	 racist	 stigmatizations	 to	mobilize	 their	 constituencies.	 	 Recep	 Tayyip	
Erdogan,	the	President	of	Turkey	and	a	prominent	leader	of	the	AKP,	recently	stated:		
“According	 to	 them	 we	 don’t	 understand	 politics.	 According	 to	 them	 we	 don’t	
understand	 art,	 theatre,	 cinema,	 poetry.	 According	 to	 them	 we	 don’t	 understand	
aesthetics,	 architecture.	 According	 to	 them	 we	 are	 uneducated,	 ignorant,	 the	 lower	
class,	who	has	to	be	content	with	what	is	being	given,	needy;	meaning,	we	are	a	group	
of	negroes”	(Ogret).	
This	quote	exemplifies	the	significance	of	the	differences	between	the	rural	and	urban	Turks	in	
Western	Turkish	cities	and	the	existence	of	a	counter-movement,	where	so-called	Black	Turks	
are	challenging	the	dominant	politics	of	difference	in	Turkey	that	has	been	constructed	by	the	
White	Turks.		
	 Housing	and	neighborhood	locations	are	a	major	way	in	which	the	rural	and	urban	Turks	
are	separated	within	the	Western	cities.		When	migrants	first	move	to	Western	cities,	they	have	
a	tendency	to	settle	 in	a	neighborhood	with	other	migrants	 from	their	own	town,	villages,	or	
province	 of	 origin.	 	 This	 allows	 for	 a	 degree	 of	 comfort,	 assistance,	 and	 support	 for	 them	
migrants	 after	 their	 move	 to	 a	 city,	 where	 a	 culture	 different	 than	 their	 own	 dominates.		
Traditional	 values,	 cultures,	 and	 practices	 are	 still	 used	 in	 business	 and	 social	 interactions,	
giving	 one	 a	 sense	 of	 home.	 	 These	 migrant	 neighborhoods,	 though,	 construct	 a	 barrier,	
whether	purposeful	or	not,	between	 their	neighborhoods	and	 the	 rest	of	 the	city,	where	 the	
long	term	urban	Turks	are	located.					
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The	 migrant	 communities	 addressed	 above	 are	 traditionally	 called	 Gecekondus,	
meaning	“built	at	night”.	 	This	 is	because,	due	to	a	 loophole	 in	an	old	Turkish	 law,	building	a	
home	on	a	property	 that	was	not	 the	builder’s	own	was	only	defined	as	 illegal	while	 the	sun	
was	up.		After	discovering	this	loophole,	new	migrants	would	move	to	government-owned	land,	
build	their	house	overnight,	and	move	in	the	next	morning	before	the	government	could	knock	
it	down.	 	Millions	of	people	now	live	 in	Gecekondu	neighborhoods,	which	are	not	built	 in	the	
same	 way	 anymore,	 but	 are	 still	 associated	 with	 the	 negative	 connotations	 assigned	 to	 the	
original	Gecekondus.		The	migrants	who	lived	in	the	original	Gecekondu	settlements	were	those	
who	could	not	afford	normal,	legal	housing,	and	today’s	Gecekondu	residents	are	continued	to	
be	thought	of	as	uneducated,	poor,	unlawful,	and	backwards	by	the	urban	Turks.	 	Because	of	
the	negative	connotations	attached	to	Gecekondus,	urban	Turks	do	not	care	to	associate	with	
the	 people	 living	 in	 them,	 leading	 to	 increased	 separation	 between	 the	migrants	 and	 locals.		
Many	migrants	 living	 in	 the	Gecekondus	 have	 reported	 feeling	 lesser	 and	 stigmatized	by	 the	
urban	Turks	 for	 their	housing	 location	 (Erman).	 	 The	Gecekondu	 residents	have	brought	with	
them	 or	 adopted	 some	 of	 the	 traditional	 values	 and	 practices	 for	 business	 and	 social	
interactions,	creating	more	difference	between	the	migrants	and	urban	Turks.		These	indicators	
suggest	 that	 housing	 location	 is	 a	 critical	 arena	 for	 the	 politics	 of	 difference	 between	 rural	
migrants	 and	 urbanites	 in	 the	 cities	 of	 Western	 Turkey.	 	 Below	 is	 a	 picture	 of	 an	 Ankara	
Gecekondu.		As	one	can	see,	the	Gecekondu	community	is	slum-like,	considered	an	eye-sore	by	
the	long-term	city	residents.			
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Figure	11:	Ankara	Gecekondu	(Smith)	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
The	differences	created	through	housing	locations	and	the	subsequent	consequences	of	
separation	 between	 rural	 and	 urban	 Turks	 also	 reflects	 itself	 in	 Turkish	 politics.	 	 The	 CHP,	 a	
liberal,	secular	Turkish	party	has	had	a	 large	support	base	in	the	Western	Turkish	cities.	 	 	The	
CHP	also	supports	a	purely	secular	and	Westernized	Turkey,	one	that	challenges	the	traditional	
views	 of	 the	 Anatolian	 Turks.	 	 The	 AKP,	 a	 conservative,	 mildly	 Islamist,	 economically	 liberal	
party,	provides	a	political	voice	to	these	migrants	who	feel	negatively	affected	by	CHP	policy.	
Because	 the	population	of	 rural	migrants	 in	Western	 cities	 is	 growing,	 and	becoming	 a	 large	
proportion	of	respective	urban	populations,	their	political	voice	is	making	a	huge	difference	in	
politics	there.		The	CHP’s	support	is	still	very	strong	with	the	urban	Turks,	but	is	being	quickly	
overshadowed	by	migrant	support	 for	the	AKP.	 	This	gives	the	AKP	a	support	base	across	the	
country.	
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Clientelism	and	the	policies	of	imece	and	himaye	also	play	a	role	in	voter	support	in	the	
Western	Turkish	cities,	where	the	AKP	reaches	out	to	migrant	communities	and	provides	goods	
and	services.	 	 	The	AKP	has	practiced	clientelism	in	a	different	way	than	past	parties	have,	by	
using	 the	 TOKI,	 Turkey’s	 Mass	 Housing	 Administration.	 	 TOKI	 builds	 government	 housing,	
normally	occupied	by	lower-income	Turks.		The	AKP	increased	TOKI’s	power	by	having	it	report	
straight	 to	 the	 Prime	 Minister	 and	 giving	 it	 a	 seat	 in	 the	 Turkish	 cabinet	 and	 decreasing	
restrictions	on	 its	operations.	 	TOKI	now	has	more	power	 in	picking	 the	contractors,	 types	of	
housing	being	built,	and	where	 the	housing	 is	built.	 	The	majority	of	contractors	selected	are	
pro-AKP	and	AKP	supporters	are	usually	chosen	 first	 for	construction	 jobs.	 	Not	only	do	TOKI	
employees	 have	more	 decision-making	 power	 and	AKP	 supporters	 have	more	 jobs,	 the	 local	
municipalities	 that	 are	 chosen	 for	 TOKI	 housing	 projects	 have	 a	 stimulated	 economy.	 	 This	
stimulated	economy	keeps	residents	happy	with	the	AKP	government.		
The	AKP	also	provides	goods	and	services	directly	 to	migrant	communities	 in	Western	
cities.	 	 Here,	 an	 AKP	 representative	 for	 the	migrant	 community	 takes	 care	 of	 problems	 that	
arise.		The	migrants	get	the	idea	that	the	AKP	cares	about	them,	and	takes	care	of	them	like	the	
CHP	does	not.		Through	these	actions,	the	AKP	creates	a	community	of	loyal,	trusting	voters.			
	 Overall,	 the	AKP	provides	a	counter-identity	 for	the	migrants	 living	 in	Western	Turkish	
cities.		After	being	stigmatized	by	the	long-term	residents	of	these	major	urban	centers,	the	AKP	
allows	the	migrants	to	have	political	voices	and	power,	and	affect	change	in	their	community.		
These	migrants	provide	a	major	support	base	for	the	AKP	in	Western	cities,	where	one	would	
not	originally	expect	AKP	support	 to	be	so	high.	 	This	also	affects	 the	AKP’s	 relationship	with	
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under-developed	regions,	because	of	the	Western	regions’	high	development	index	scores.		The	
migrants	in	Western	cities	are	a	very	important	group	of	AKP’s	support	base.			
	
V.	Conclusion	
	
The	AKP	ruins	every	assumption	that	one	would	have	about	the	usual	political	party	in	
Turkey.	 	 As	 a	 conservative,	 mildly-Islamist	 party,	 they	 manage	 to	 gain	 high	 levels	 of	 voter	
support	in	all	provinces	and	regions	of	Turkey	and	across	all	levels	of	development.		This	is	not	
what	 one	 would	 expect	 would	 happen,	 considering	 the	 traditional	 cleavages	 of	 Turkey’s	
political	parties	that	the	CHP	follows.	 	This	happens,	as	seen	above,	because	of	the	Anatolian	
Tigers	 and	 Islamic	 Calvinists	 in	 Central	 Turkey,	 the	 politics	 of	 difference	 in	 Western	 Turkish	
cities,	 and	 HDP	 support	 in	 Southeastern	 Anatolia	 that	 decreases	 the	 AKP’s	 relationship	 with	
development.			
As	time	passes	though,	it	seems	that	Turkey’s	political	party	cleavages	are	beginning	to	
change.	 	 There	 are	 signs	 of	 a	 shift	 from	 secular	 /	 Islamic	 and	 developed	 /	 under	 developed	
divisions	towards	one	of	class.		Differences	in	social	class	are	becoming	much	more	significant,	
leading	 left	wing	parties	 to	have	more	of	an	appeal.	 	The	 future	of	 the	AKP,	because	of	 their	
numerous	corruption	scandals,	 repression	of	 freedoms	of	press,	assembly,	and	speech,	and	a	
hint	of	a	shift	in	party	cleavages,	is	unknown.		As	Turkey’s	global	importance	and	influence	rises,	
the	world	should	be	watching.			
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